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Abstract	
This	 paper	 uses	 examples	 from	 the	 history	 and	 practices	 of	 multi‐national	 and	 large	
companies	 in	 the	 oil,	 chemical	 and	 asbestos	 industries	 to	 examine	 their	 legal	 and	 illegal	
despoiling	 and	 destruction	 of	 the	 environment	 and	 impact	 on	 human	 and	 non‐human	 life.	
The	discussion	draws	on	the	literature	on	green	criminology	and	state‐corporate	crime	and	
considers	measures	 and	 arrangements	 that	might	mitigate	 or	 prevent	 such	damaging	 acts.	
This	paper	is	part	of	ongoing	work	on	green	criminology	and	crimes	of	the	economy.	It	places	
these	actions	and	crimes	in	the	context	of	a	global	neo‐liberal	economic	system	and	considers	
and	 critiques	 the	 distorting	 impact	 of	 the	 GDP	 model	 of	 ‘economic	 health’	 and	 its	
consequences	for	the	environment.		
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Introduction	
This	paper	uses	examples	from	the	history	and	practices	of	multi‐national	and	large	companies	
in	 the	 oil,	 chemical	 and	 asbestos	 industries	 to	 examine	 their	 legal	 and	 illegal	 despoiling	 and	
destruction	of	the	environment	and	impact	on	human	and	non‐human	life.	Despoilation	is	here	
defined	as	plundering	and	taking	what	is	valuable	and	/	or	depriving	others	of	what	is	valuable	
by	 force	 or	 without	 giving	 others	 the	 benefit	 of	 choice	 about	 actions	 that	 affect	 them.	 This	
effectively	sums	up	much	of	what	concerns	us	about	the	impact	of	crimes	of	the	economy	on	the	
environment.	The	discussion	draws	on	the	literature	on	green	criminology	and	state‐corporate	
crime	and	considers	measures	and	arrangements	that	might	mitigate	or	prevent	such	damaging	
acts.	 This	 paper	 is	 part	 of	 ongoing	 work	 on	 green	 criminology	 and	 crimes	 of	 the	 economy	
(Ruggiero	and	South	2010,	2013).	
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History:	Multi‐national	and	state‐national	resource	exploitation	
According	to	White	(2013a:	255),	‘The	most	criminogenic	agents	of	environmental	harm	within	
a	 global	 capitalist	 political	 economy	 are	members	 of	 the	 capitalist	 class,	 operating	within	 the	
institutional	 context	 of	 transnational	 corporations’.	 Power	 misused	 or	 used	 for	 profit	 to	 the	
exclusion	 of	 all	 else	 is	 likely	 to	 cause	 harm.	 Business	 and	 government	 interests	 exploit	 both	
environmental	resources	and	human	labour.	But	even	more	damaging	is	that,	although	all	this	
may	apply	to	market	economies	in	general,	hegemonic	discourses	around	‘growth	and	freedom’	
have,	during	the	last	few	decades,	intensified	the	potential	destructiveness	of	enterprise.	In	this	
respect,	 neo‐liberal	 doctrines	 contradict	 their	 very	 axioms:	 namely,	 that	 the	 full	 costs	 of	
transactions	must	be	borne	by	the	involved	parties.	Many	economic	activities	and	transactions,	
on	 the	 contrary,	 exact	 a	 significant	 price	 on	 humans	 and	 ecosystems,	 although	 conventional	
economists	 label	 such	 price	 with	 the	 reassuring	 euphemism	 ‘externalities’.	 In	 brief,	 neo‐
liberalism	 regards	 environmental	 harm	 as	 accidental,	 unintentional	 and	 external	 –	 but	 also,	
unimportant.		
	
A	perfect	formulation	of	unintended	consequences	or	externalities	is	found	in	Hayek’s	argument	
whereby	 only	 actions	 affecting	 other	 persons	 will	 give	 rise	 to	 legal	 rules	 (Ruggiero	 2013).	
‘Actions	which	 are	 clearly	 not	 of	 this	 kind	…	which	 clearly	 cannot	 affect	 or	 harm	others,	 can	
never	become	the	subject	of	rules	of	conduct’	(Hayek	1973:	101).	In	a	crucial	proviso,	however,	
it	is	stressed	that	‘some	harm	knowingly	caused	to	others	is	even	essential	for	the	preservation	
of	 spontaneous	order’;	 for	example,	 the	 law	cannot	prohibit	 ‘the	setting	up	of	a	new	business	
even	 if	 this	will	 lead	 to	 the	 failure	of	another’	 (Hayek	1973:	102).	Law	and	 legality,	 therefore,	
incorporate	 a	 range	 of	 conflicting	 expectations,	 some	 of	 which	 are	 bound	 to	 prevail,	 and	we	
constantly	 have	 to	 decide	 which	 deserve	 priority.	 Decisions	 in	 this	 respect	 will,	 in	 some	
measure,	be	part	of	an	experimental	process.		
	
In	the	course	of	this	process	it	will	be	found	not	only	that	not	all	expectations	can	
be	protected	by	general	rules,	but	even	that	the	chance	of	as	many	expectations	
as	 possible	 being	 fulfilled	 will	 be	 most	 enhanced	 if	 some	 expectations	 are	
systematically	disappointed.	This	means	also	that	it	is	not	possible	or	desirable	to	
prevent	 all	 actions	 which	 will	 harm	 others	 but	 only	 certain	 kinds	 of	 actions.	
(Hayek	1973:	102)		
	
This	justification	for	the	necessity	or	desirability	of	harm	is	accompanied	by	a	view	of	economic	
growth	 as	 a	 matter	 of	 constant	 change	 and,	 consequently,	 as	 an	 incessant	 discovery	 of	 new	
methods	of	creating	wealth.	According	to	this	view,	the	only	way	to	establish	which	methods	are	
legitimate	consists	in	the	drawing	of	precise	boundaries	within	which	action	is	acceptable.	This	
entails	the	demarcation	of	a	range	of	‘objects	over	which	only	particular	individuals	are	allowed	
to	 dispose	 and	 from	 the	 control	 of	 which	 all	 others	 are	 excluded’	 (Hayek	 1973:	 107).	 The	
distinction	Hayek	makes	between	meum	and	tuum	(‘mine’	and	‘thine’)	has	to	be	clearly	drawn:	
‘good	fences	make	good	neighbours’.	From	this	perspective,	by	drawing	boundaries,	the	aim	of	
the	 law	 is	 merely	 to	 prevent,	 as	 much	 as	 possible,	 the	 actions	 of	 different	 individuals	 from	
interfering	with	 each	 other.	 The	 law	 cannot	 be	 concerned	with	 the	 effects	 of	 such	 actions	 on	
different	 individuals	 and	 justice	 should	 not	 be	 concerned	 with	 the	 results	 of	 the	 various	
transactions	but	only	with	whether	the	transactions	themselves	are	fair.	Harm	against	humans	
and	the	environment,	therefore,	may	be	a	fair	outcome	of	economic	initiative.	
	
Within	the	neoliberalism	world‐view,	the	entire	planet	is	given	to	those	who	are	most	capable	of	
exploiting	 it.	The	environment	 is	 therefore	both	meum	 (mine)	and	tuum	 (yours),	provided	we	
both	know	how	to	maximise	extraction	of	value	from	it.	Boundaries	are	not	determined	by	the	
identification	of	objects	over	which	different	 individuals	may	or	may	not	 exercise	 control	but	
merely	 by	 the	 capacity	 and	 ingenuity	 of	 such	 individuals	 which	 constitute	 the	 only	 limits	 to	
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initiative	and	development.	The	ultimate	resource,	in	brief,	is	the	human	mind	and	throughout	
human	 history	 the	 genius	 of	 the	 species	 for	 enterprise	 and	 exploitation	 has	 always	 won	 out	
against	the	restraints	and	resistance	of	nature.		
	
Perspectives:	State‐corporate	crime	and	green	criminology	
In	his	classic	contribution	to	criminology,	Sutherland	(1949)	famously	pointed	out	that	research	
on	 the	 crimes	 of	 the	 powerful	 is	 difficult	 without	 a	 willingness	 to	 expand	 one’s	 sample	 well	
beyond	 the	 legal	 definitions	 of	 crime.	 Two	 perspectives	 that	 draw	 upon	 this	 insight	 are	
considered	and	applied	here	–	state‐corporate	crime	analysis	and	green	criminology.	
	
Kramer	 et	 al.	 (2002;	 see	 also	Katz	 2010)	 define	 the	 state‐corporate	 crime	 approach	 as	 being	
concerned	with:		
	
…	 illegal	 or	 socially	 injurious	 actions	 that	 result	 from	 a	 mutually	 reinforcing	
interaction	between	(1)	policies	and/or	practices	in	pursuit	of	the	goals	of	one	or	
more	 institutions	 of	 political	 governance	 and	 (2)	 policies	 and/or	 practices	 in	
pursuit	 of	 the	 goals	 of	 one	 or	 more	 institutions	 of	 economic	 production	 and	
distribution.	(Kramer	et	al.	2002:	271)		
	
Katz	(2010)	shows	how	the	state‐corporate	crime	perspective	developed	by	Kramer	et	al.	can	
be	usefully	 applied	 to	 cases	 involving	 corporate	power	 and	environmental	 crime	 at	 local	 and	
global	levels	and	there	are	many	other	examples	of	environmental	harms	and	crimes	that	can	be	
seen	 as	 state‐corporate	 crimes	 (Kramer	 and	 Michalowski	 2012;	 Smandych	 and	 Kueneman	
2010).	 Examples	 include:	 corporate	 criminality	 and	 its	 impacts	 on	 the	 environment,	 such	 as	
pollution;	health	and	safety	 in	the	workplace	where	breaches	have	environmentally	damaging	
consequences;	 involvement	 of	 criminal	 entrepreneurs	 and	 corrupt	 officials	 in	 the	 illegal	
disposal	of	toxic	waste;	and	the	impact	and	legacy	of	law	enforcement	and	military	operations	
on	landscapes,	water	supply,	air	quality	and	living	organisms	populating	these	areas	–	human,	
animal	and	plant.	A	Green	criminology	perspective	can	also	be	brought	to	bear	on	such	actions	
and	 impacts.	 ‘Green	 criminology’	 is	 an	 umbrella	 term	 to	 cover	 and	 capture	 the	 study	 of	
ecological,	 environmental	 or	 green	 crime	 or	 harm,	 and	 related	 matters	 of	 speciesism	 and	 of	
environmental	(in)justice	(South	et	al.	2013;	South	and	Brisman	2013;	White	in	press).	It	is	not	
intended	 to	 be	 a	 unitary	 enterprise	 –	 diversity	 is	 one	 of	 its	 great	 strengths;	 it	 remains	 an	
evolving	perspective	(see,	for	example,	South	1998:	212‐213;	White	2008:14).	Adopting	a	green	
criminology	approach	and	describing	the	impacts	of	eco‐crime,	Walters	(2010)	writes	that:		
	
The	contamination	of	drinking	water,	the	degradation	of	soil	and	the	pollution	of	
air	and	land	all	expose	people	(usually	those	in	poor	and	developing	countries)	to	
substantial	health	risks	…	[and	notes	that]	As	Hauck	(2007)	has	observed,	acts	of	
eco	crime	are	linked	to	the	poverty	and	social	dislocation,	as	well	as	the	mental	
and	 physical	 debilitation,	 of	 people	who	 are	 victims	 of	 corporations	 and	 states	
that	deliberately	violate	environmental	agreements.	(Walters	2010:	181)		
	
The	case	studies	discussed	below	provide	key	examples.	
	
Oil	crimes:	Criminogenesis	and	despoilation	
The	 oil	 industry	 is	 involved	 in	 various	 forms	 of	 crime	 and	 harm	 and	 in	 varying	ways.	 Direct	
crimes	and	harms	of	pollution	may	be	seen	as	the	‘primary’	or	principal	offences	here.	However,	
as	noted	 elsewhere	 (South	 et	 al.	 2013:	 29‐30),	 it	 is	 also	 important	 to	 record	 the	 incidence	of	
‘secondary’	crimes	and	harms	in	which	the	existence	or	activity	of	an	operation	or	configuration	
of	 operations	 can	 be	 criminogenic,	 attracting	 and/or	 facilitating	 and/or	 causing	 other	 crimes	
and	 harms.	 Thus	 oil	 exploitation	 and	 enterprises	 can	 also	 contribute	 to	 the	 creation	 of	
criminogenic	environments	in	which	others	are	incentivised	or	pushed	to	offend.	For	example,	
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some	oil	rich	countries	are	described	as	incubators	for	criminal	enterprise,	where	oil	companies	
are	 the	 ‘crime	 victims’	 and	 the	 illicit	 profits	 that	 result	 are	 used	 for	 financing	 other	 illegal	
activities.	 Official	 reports	 have	 drawn	 attention	 to,	 on	 the	 one	 hand,	 the	 use	 of	 diverted	 oil	
profits	to	fund	campaigns	of	violence	–	including	terrorism	–	and,	on	the	other,	the	weakening	of	
already	 fragile	 states	 caused	 by	 crimes	 committed	 against	 the	 oil	 sector.	 McHugh	 (2012:	 2)	
provides	analysis	of	 this	complex	set	of	 inter‐relationships	and	also	provides	 insights	 into	 the	
nature	of	illicit	oil	trading.	
	
According	to	McHugh,	illicit	and	unrecorded	crude	oil	trading	occurs	in	several	different	ways:		
	
Smuggling:	 While	 being	 an	 international	 industry,	 oil	 does	 not	 have	 standardised	 pricing.	 In	
some	countries	subsidies	and	tariffs	distort	the	market	and	can	result	in	higher	or	lower	costs.	
Because	 oil	 is	 obviously	 a	 valuable	 and	 transportable	 resource,	 this	 differential	 in	 pricing	 in	
different	markets	means	 that	 domestic	 and	 transnational	 illegal	markets	 are	 incentivised	and	
vulnerable	 elements	 of	 the	 population	 in	 oil	 wealthy	 states	 who	 do	 not	 benefit	 from	 energy	
revenues	may	 find	 smuggling	oil	 a	useful	 alternative	 source	of	 income.	This	 is	 a	 case	of	what	
Passas	(1999)	calls	‘criminogenic	asymmetry’.	
	
Mingling:	 This	 form	 of	 oil	 theft	 occurs	 through	 the	 mingling	 of	 officially‐sourced	 and	
unofficially‐sourced	 oil.	 In	 this	 case,	 criminal	 entrepreneurs	 are	 able	 to	 directly	 extract	 a	
quantity	 of	 crude	 oil	 beyond	 the	 amount	 officially	 licensed.	 However,	 sustained	 and	 sizeable	
‘mingling’	 operations	 are	 usually	made	 possible	 by	 the	 complicity	 of	 corrupt	 officials	 and/or	
employees	of	the	oil	companies	themselves.	The	illicit	portion	extracted	is	then	transported	and	
sold	on	the	illegal	market.		
	
Bunkering:	This	theft	method	entails	the	direct	theft	of	oil	from	ships	and	pipelines.	The	method,	
however,	may	be	complex	and	risky	due	 to	surveillance	and	 the	equipment	required.	For	 this	
reason	 it	 may	 be	 easier	 to	 accomplish	 and	 more	 prevalent	 in	 situations	 of	 high	 social	 and	
political	instability.	Conditions	of	conflict	have	always	been,	and	remain,	a	risky	but	useful	cover	
for	pillage.		
	
All	 three	 of	 these	 types	 of	 enterprising	 economic	 behaviour	 are	 particularly	 prominent	 in	
contexts	in	which	well‐structured	criminal	organisations	operate	and	where	illegal	enterprises	
are	meshed	with	violent	 insurgent	groups:	 in	 Iraq	and	Nigeria,	 for	 example.	 In	 such	contexts,	
political	 and	 economic	 purposes	 intertwine	 and	 conflict	 is	 exacerbated	 by	 hostile	 feelings	
aligned	against	foreign‐owned	companies	and	the	national	military	forces	that	are	securing	this	
extraction	 of	 wealth	 for	 the	 domestic	 elite	 and	 for	 the	 externalisation	 of	 profits	 to	 overseas	
companies.	 Transparency	 International’s	 ‘Corruption	 Perception	 Index’	 ranks	 oil‐producing	
states	in	the	Middle	East,	Africa	and	South	America	as	among	the	most	corrupt	in	the	world.		
	
There	 is,	 therefore,	 a	 close	 connection	 between	 crime	 –	 including	 violent	 crime	 –	 and	 oil,	 as	
exemplified	 in	 these	and	 the	 following	 cases.	 First,	 the	oil	 industry	generates	a	 ‘rentier	 effect’	
(the	literal	‘renting’	of	Indigenous	resources	to	external	parties),	producing	revenues	for	oil‐rich	
countries	but	in	contexts	where	elites	fail	to	equitably	distribute	the	incoming	wealth	among	the	
wider	population	 (Brisman	 and	 South	2013:	 60).	 Corruption	 is	widespread,	with	parts	 of	 the	
incoming	 revenues	 being	 appropriated	 by	 government	 officials	 and	 mediators	 who	 transfer	
them	into	their	own	bank	accounts	abroad.	The	civil	war	in	Sudan,	the	largest	country	in	Africa,	
is	a	good	example	of	how	systemic	forms	of	crime	and	violence	are	central	to	the	geopolitics	of	
oil.		
	
The	inequitable	distribution	of	the	costs	and	benefits	of	oil	production	fueled	the	
Sudanese	civil	war.	The	war	resulted	in	approximately	2	million	deaths,	4	million	
internally	 displaced,	 420,000	 refugees,	 and	 approximately	 2,500	 rebel	 child	
soldiers.	(Parr	2013:	140)		
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In	 order	 to	 allow	 foreign	 companies	 to	 extract	 oil	 in	 its	 territory,	 the	 Sudanese	 government	
expelled	the	Indigenous	population	from	their	lands,	which	resulted	in	violent	protest	by	locals	
who	depended	on	 the	 land	 for	 their	 livelihood.	The	 creation	of	 the	Sudan	People’s	Liberation	
Army	(established	in	1983)	was	the	ultimate	outcome	of	this	process	(Switzer	2002).	Similarly,	
in	Nigeria,	where	 in	 the	post	9/11	era	 the	US	has	 sought	 its	main	 source	of	oil	 supply,	 social	
tension	has	led	to	the	development	of	organised	violent	contest	and	conflict.	The	Ogoni	from	the	
Delta	region,	where	Nigeria’s	vast	oil	reserves	lie,	have	incurred	the	costs	of	oil	extraction	but	
have	been	excluded	 from	the	enjoyment	of	 the	wealth	generated.	 In	general	 terms,	 the	multi‐
billion‐dollar	oil	industry	of	Nigeria	has	not	produced	an	increase	in	per	capita	annual	income	in	
the	 country:	 in	 fact,	 income	 has	 fallen,	 with	 the	 number	 of	 Nigerians	 living	 on	 less	 than	 one	
dollar	a	day	increasing	from	36	per	cent	in	1970	to	more	than	70	per	cent	in	2000.	Moreover,	
foreign	companies	operating	in	the	country	have	set	up	their	own	paramilitary	forces	to	protect	
their	business	and	funded	local	groups	of	mercenaries	to	respond	to	attacks	by	violent	political	
organisations	(Watts	2008).	In	this	way,	corrupt	practices,	impoverishment	of	local	people	and	
military	action	have	mingled	and	fed	on	each	other	in	many	oil	producing	countries	(Amnesty	
International	2001;	Everest	2003;	Klare	2004;	Parra	2004).		
	
There	 are,	 of	 course,	 other	ways	 in	which	 the	 intertwining	 of	 big	 oil,	 corporate	 interests	 and	
state	complicity	has	consequences	for	the	conditions	of	human	and	environmental	life.		
	
Beyond	Petroleum?	
On	20	April	2010,	the	BP	(British	Petroleum)	Deepwater	Horizon	operation	blew	out	in	the	Gulf	
of	Mexico,	 spilling	almost	 five	million	barrels	of	oil	and	killing	11	workers.	Neither	 the	short‐
term	environmental	damage	nor	 long‐term	 impacts	of	 this	event	have	yet	been	 fully	assessed	
(Achenbach	 2011;	 Bergin	 2011;	 Schwartz	 2011).	 BP	 blamed	 Transocean,	 the	 company	 that	
owned	and	 operated	 the	drilling	 rig,	 and	Halliburton,	which	 carried	out	 the	 cementing	 job.	 It	
was	difficult	to	establish	whether	BP	itself	was	responsible	or	whether	this	was	the	inevitable	
outcome	of	the	risky	offshore	business.	The	story	of	BP	grants	validity	to	both	hypotheses.		
	
John	Browne	was	the	company’s	chief	executive	between	1995	and	2007	and	was	credited	with	
‘turning	a	sleepy,	tradition‐encrusted	firm	into	an	aggressive	top‐rank	juggernaut’	(Maass	2011:	
38).	Browne	earned	a	business	degree	 from	Stanford	University	and	applied	 the	management	
principles	learned	there	to	the	reorganisation	of	the	company	(Schwartz	2011).	BP	was	divided	
into	 strategic	 business	 units,	 workers	 were	 fired,	 and	 managers	 were	 given	 short‐term	
contracts	with	renewal	linked	to	meeting	targets	based	on	high	volume	production	at	low	costs:		
	
Those	 who	 could	 extract	 the	 most	 oil	 while	 spending	 the	 least	 money	 were	
rewarded	 with	 promotions	 and	 bonuses.	 Promising	 junior	 executives	 were	
shuffled	between	posts	and	over	the	world,	rarely	staying	anywhere	long	enough	
to	 bother	 replacing	 outdated	 equipment	 or	 rusting	 pipelines.	 (Schwartz	 2011:	
25)		
	
Yet	Browne	covered	 this	operational	 ‘business	as	usual’	with	a	 claim	 to	be	 striving	 for	 a	new	
way	of	doing	things,	adopting	the	‘sunburst’	logo	and	new	aspirations	in	which	BP	was	said	to	
stand	 for	 ‘better	 people,	 better	 products,	 big	 picture,	 beyond	 petroleum’.	 Moving	 ‘Beyond	
Petroleum’	 was	 a	 claim	 to	 green	 credentials	 and	 a	 natural,	 clean	 image.	 This	 is,	 after	 all,	 a	
message	many	or	most	consumers	would	like	to	buy	into	–	we	can	have	what	we	want	to	fuel	
our	 consumer	 lifestyles	 because	 the	 necessary	 resources	 can	 be	 replaced,	 renewed	 or	 are	
limitless.		
	
The	 ‘beyond	petroleum’	strategy	was	a	classic	case	of	greenwashing.	This	 is	not	 to	say	energy	
companies	would	not	like	to	find	exploitable	and	infinitely	available	sources	but	they	have	not	
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done	 so	 yet	 and,	 until	 they	 do,	 they	 will	 manufacture	messages	 of	 denial	 about	 the	 ongoing	
harms	of	current	methods	of	extraction,	production	and	distribution.	Nor	is	this	to	say	that	the	
big	 corporations	 alone	 are	 solely	 responsible	 for	 damage	 done	 and	 demand	 that	 continues	
unassuaged.	 Agnew	 (2013)	 has	 recently	 been	 reminding	 us	 that	 everyday	 consumption	
behaviours	constitute	contributions	to	an	accumulating	ecocide	as	individuals	and	small	groups	
engage	in	a	range	of	‘ordinary’	acts	such	as	driving	cars	that	use	large	amounts	of	fuel,	living	in	
un‐necessarily	large	homes	that	are	over‐heated	or	over‐cooled,	and	so	on.	In	this	light,	it	was	
an	 interesting	 reflection	 of	 lack	 of	 such	 insight	 that,	 during	 the	 2010	 BP	 oil	 spill,	 a	 sign	was	
erected	in	a	village	in	southern	Louisiana	with	the	message	‘Damn	BP!	God	Bless	America!’.	To	
condemn	large	oil	companies	for	catastrophic	failings	is	understandable	but	such	events	should	
ideally	 lead	 to	 some	 reflection	 on	 the	 life‐style	 of	 those	 demanding	 greater	 efficiency	 and	
productivity	 from	 their	 operations.	 Within	 a	 year	 the	 US	 public	 was	 once	 again	 supporting	
‘energy	 exploratory	 initiatives	 even	 if	 they	 were	 made	 at	 the	 expense	 of	 environmental	
concerns’	(Parr	2013:	131).	More	appropriately,	the	sign	should	have	borne	the	slogan:	‘Damn	
an	economic	system	based	on	an	assumption	of	infinite	growth’.		
	
Environmental	 harm	 is	 not,	 of	 course,	 exclusively	 associated	 with	 privately‐owned	 oil	
companies.	Even	when	sovereign	states	 take	over	 the	control	of	 the	oil	 industry,	 they	may	do	
equally	little	to	curtail	the	risks	inherent	to	the	industry.	For	example,	in	June	2013,	an	oil	spill	
in	 the	Ecuadorean	Amazon	spread	downstream	towards	Peru	and	Brazil.	Approximately	1.6m	
litres	of	crude	oil	were	discharged	into	local	rivers,	contaminating	the	drinking	supply	of	Coca	in	
Ecuador,	a	gateway	city	into	the	Amazon	forest	(Watts	2013).	Peru	reported	traces	of	oil	in	its	
Amazon	region	of	Loreto	while	Brazil,	hundreds	of	miles	downstream,	put	its	navy	on	alert.	The	
environment	of	Ecuador,	the	smallest	member	of	OPEC,	has	long	suffered	from	the	actions	of	the	
powerful	oil	industry	and	in	2001	the	country’s	courts	ruled	that	US	oil	firm	Chevron	should	pay	
$8.6	billion	in	compensation	for	the	dumping	of	about	seven	billion	litres	of	waste	over	several	
decades.	Today,	the	oilfields	are	‘largely	owned	and	operated	by	domestic	state‐run	companies’	
but,	rather	than	decreasing	output,	‘the	government	plans	to	raise	production	in	the	Amazon	to	
fund	an	ambitious	development	programme’	(Watts	2013:	19).	
	
We	also	know	that	the	corporate‐state	regulatory	system	allows	the	oil	companies	themselves	
to	provide	key	measure	of	the	extent	of	oil	spills	and	damage	and	that,	as	research	published	in	
Nature	shows,	this	is	–	unsurprisingly	–	often	an	under‐estimate	of	the	true	extent	of	spill	and	
damage	(Schrope	2013).	
	
And	 this,	 of	 course,	 relates	 to	 cases	 that	 are	 known	 and	 reported.	 There	 are	 spills,	 leaks	 and	
ecological	 damage	 occurring	 on	 a	 highly	 regular	 basis	 across	 the	 world,	 the	 majority	 never	
attracting	the	kind	of	publicity	attached	to	BP	Deepwater	Horizon	(Brisman	and	South	2013:	9‐
10).	Here,	White’s	concept	of	eco‐global	criminology	is	relevant	to	the	different	environmental	
stories	and	differentiated	experience	of	justice	playing	out	around	the	world.		
	
Chemical	crimes:	Hazards	and	toxicity	
Many	 hazardous	 substances	 cause	 chemical	 injury	 and,	 with	 thousands	 of	 new	 chemicals	
introduced	each	year,	 it	 is	very	difficult	 to	estimate	 their	 long‐term	effects.	Chemicals	are	not	
typically	tested	 for	brain,	 immune	and	hormonal	effects,	and	often	not	tested	at	all	 for	cancer,	
neurodegenerative	 or	 autoimmune	 effects.	 Inadequate	 testing	 greatly	 limits	 knowledge	 for	
prevention	 of	 harm,	 choosing	 safer	 substances	 and	 technologies,	 and	 linking	 damage	 to	
exposure	 for	 affected	 persons,	 non‐human	 species	 and	 the	 wider	 environment	 (Lynch	 and	
Stretesky	2001).	
	
On	 a	 larger	 scale,	 research	 into	 chemical	 crimes	 is	 hampered	 by	 often‐successful	 attempts	 to	
depict	violations	of	laws,	regulations	or	just	good	practice,	as	‘accidents’,	‘oversights’,	‘failures	of	
communication’,	 ‘administrative	 errors’,	 and	 so	 on.	 According	 to	 Pearce	 and	 Tombs	 (1998),	
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human	error	is	transcended	and	attention	is	drawn	to	general	categories	of	accident	causation.	
The	 first	 such	 category	 is	 ‘resourcing’,	 which	 refers	 to	 a	 range	 of	 in‐built	 deficiencies	
characterising	 the	 chemicals	 industry	 as	 a	 whole:	 its	 personnel,	 hardware,	 production	
pressures,	planning,	communication,	training,	plant	design	and	maintenance.	All	of	these	causal	
factors,	 which	 are	 also	 termed	 first‐order	 causes,	 are	 underpinned	 by	 second‐order	 causes,	
among	which	Pearce	and	Tombs	include	and	critique	‘the	inherent	drive	towards	maximisation	
of	 profits	 in	 a	 capitalist	 system’,	 technological	 complexity,	 amoral	 calculation,	 and	 the	
inevitability	 of	 mistakes.	 To	 illuminate	 the	 nature	 of	 second‐order	 causes	 of	 accidents,	 they	
argue	 ‘for	 the	 need	 to	 combine	 understandings	 of	 the	 nature	 of	 social	 relations	 in	 chemicals	
plants	within	a	macro	political	economy’	(Pearce	and	Tombs	1998:	140).	They	stress	the	scope	
for	manipulation	 of	 communication	 and	 remark	 that	 ‘errors’	 are	 rooted	within	 the	 power	 of	
management	 to	 select	which	 aspects	of	 knowledge	 are	 likely	 to	be	 shared	 and	 released	more	
widely	and	which	are	destined	to	remain	part	of	‘repressive	or	distorted	communication’.	This	is	
a	Habermasian	expression	that	the	authors	identify	with	the	capacity	of	managers	to	‘limit	the	
potential	 for	workers	and	their	representative	organisations	to	participate	 in	decision‐making	
processes	which	bear	crucially	upon	the	possible	prevention	of	industrial	accidents’	(Pearce	and	
Tombs	1998:	141).	Classic	case	studies	within	the	area	of	chemical	crimes	include	the	range	of	
illegal	conducts	found	in	the	pharmaceutical	industry	and	the	notorious	Bhopal	disaster,	caused	
by	the	toxic	gas	leak	at	the	Union	Carbide	plant	in	India	(Braithwaite	1984;	Cassels	1993;	Kluin	
2013;	Pearce	and	Tombs	1993).	
	
Chemical	crimes	occur	during	the	production,	distribution,	use,	storage	or	disposal	of	chemical	
substances	which	can	reasonably	be	expected	to	result	in	harm	to	people’s	health	or	safety	and/or	
to	 the	 environment	 (Salinger	 2013).	 Such	 crimes	 may	 be	 committed	 by	 offenders	who	 have	
knowledge	of	the	risks	posed	by	the	chemical	agents	they	deal	with	and/or	by	offenders	who	reject	
the	use	of	alternative	substances	which	would	reduce	such	risks.	Harm	can	be	caused	during	the	
production,	transportation	or	storage	of	the	chemical	substances	in	question,	or	during	their	use	
for	other	productive	purposes,	as	we	illustrate	below.	
	
Toxic	chemicals:	The	case	of	Dow	and	Agent	Orange	
Dow	Chemical,	 founded	 in	 1947	 and	merged	 in	 2001	with	 Union	 Carbide	 (as	 noted	 above,	 a	
company	not	without	 its	own	history	of	catastrophic	accident),	 is	a	global	operator	producing	
chemicals	 and	plastics	 for	 a	 variety	 of	 different	markets.	 Importantly,	 in	 terms	of	 how	 ‘state‐
corporate	crime’	 ‘works’,	 like	other	major	global	corporations,	Dow	can	call	on	more	 financial	
and	legal	resources	than	any	state	or	industry	agencies	charged	with	the	task	of	regulation	(Katz	
2010).		
	
As	Katz	(2010)	describes,	the	involvement	of	Dow	Chemical	in	the	production	of	herbicides	for	
military	use	provides	a	classic	case	study	of	state‐corporate	crime.	It	began	in	World	War	II	as	
part	of	a	project	that	was	initially	based	at	the	University	of	Chicago	but	soon	re‐located	to	the	
military	research	facility	at	Fort	Detrick,	to	produce	a	herbicide	with	the	now	obvious	intention	
of	 investigating	 the	potential	 of	 the	 chemical	 as	 a	weapon.	 If	 the	1950s	 saw	 the	use	of	Dow’s	
products	(labeled	2‐4‐D	and	2‐4,5‐T)	as	weed‐killing	herbicides,	all	changed	with	the	Vietnam	
conflict	of	the	1960s.	As	Katz	recounts:		
	
Dow	returned	to	developing	these	substances	for	use	as	the	main	ingredients	in	
Agent	 Orange	 ...	 Substantively,	 Dow	 became	 embedded	 with	 the	 federal	
government	as	a	result	of	an	alliance	to	produce	a	weapon,	or	in	the	language	of	
the	government,	the	company	became	integral	to	national	security,	necessitating	
a	comfortable	mutually	beneficial	relationship.	(Katz	2010:	297)	
	
The	 product	 was	 shipped	 and	 transported	 in	 orange‐striped	 barrels	 (from	 which	 the	 name	
Agent	Orange	may	derive)	with	20	million	gallons	sprayed	across	8,600	square	miles	of	forest	
Vincenzo	Ruggiero	and	Nigel	South:	Toxic	State–Corporate	Crimes,	Neo‐liberalism	and	Green	Criminology	
	
IJCJ&	SD					19	
Online	version	via	www.crimejusticejournal.com																																																																																						©	2013	2(2)	
cover	 and	 fields	 in	 Vietnam,	 Laos	 and	 Cambodia	 as	 a	major	 tactic	 of	war	 between	 1961	 and	
1971.	 In	 1971	 the	 US	 National	 Institutes	 of	 Health	 conducted	 tests	 that	 concluded	 that	 the	
chemicals	involved	could	cause	birth	defects	in	laboratory	animals	and	the	US	finally	ceased	use	
of	Agent	Orange.	However	this	was	far	too	late	to	avoid	both	the	immediate	and	lasting	legacy	
which	included	the	effects	of	exposure	on	hundreds	of	thousands	of	civilians	and	soldiers,	both	
Vietnamese	and	American.	In	addition,	the	civilian	population	would	have	been	further	exposed	
through	the	use	of	empty	barrels	 for	water	storage	and	because	waterways,	soil	and	the	 food	
chain	were	all	affected	(The	Week	Staff	2012).	
	
The	 medically	 identified	 and	 related	 effects	 of	 exposure	 have	 included	 leukemia	 and	 blood	
disorders,	heart	disease,	and	children	with	birth	defects	such	as	spina	bifida	and	limb	and	bone	
defects.	In	the	US:	
	
For	 years,	 the	 US	military,	 citing	 research	 by	 Dow	 Chemical	 ...	 denied	 any	 link	
between	 exposure	 and	 veterans'	 illnesses.	 In	 1991,	 Congress	 passed	 the	 Agent	
Orange	Act,	which	lists	more	than	a	dozen	cancers	and	other	illnesses	for	which	
the	VA	[Veteran’s	Administration]	must	compensate	veterans.	(Katz	2010:	298)		
	
As	 one	 follow‐up	 action,	 from	 2012‐16,	 the	 US	 will	 spend	 $44	 million	 on	 cleaning	 up	 some	
(though	 not	 all)	 of	 the	 legacy	 of	 this	 state‐corporate	 crime,	 aiming	 to	 extract	 dioxin	 residues	
affecting	 the	 area	 where	 most	 barrels	 were	 stored	 at	 the	 former	 US	 airbase	 in	 Danang.	
According	to	US	Ambassador	David	Shear,	 these	are	 ‘the	first	steps	to	bury	the	 legacies	of	our	
past’	but,	of	course,	the	damage	done	to	people	and	the	environment	cannot	be	undone	(Reuters	
2012).		
	
Asbestos:	Human	health	costs	and	environmental	harms	
The	activities	of	extraction	and	processing	corporations	and	the	particular	case	of	the	asbestos	
industry	are	also	deserving	of	 some	 consideration	here.	As	White	 (2013b:	52)	 acknowledges:	
‘Resource	extraction	has	a	long	history	and	extensive	geographical	reach.	It	is	also	tied	to	who	
has	the	power	to	do	what,	where,	how	cost	effectively,	and	for	whose	benefit’.	White	also	notes	
that	resource	extraction,	mining	and	processing	can	be	‘vitally	important	to	national	economies	
and	 corporate	 profits,	 especially	 where	 overall	 gross	 domestic	 product	 is	 reliant	 upon	 these	
types	of	industries’	(White	2013b:	50).	At	the	same	time,	it	has	to	be	emphasised	that	this	chain	
of	extraction	through	processing	to	product	‘is	not	socially	and	environmentally	neutral	but	has	
a	number	of	potential	ramifications	directly	related	to	ecological	wellbeing	and	human	health’	
(White	2013b:	50).	
	
The	mining	and	subsequent	chemical	and	industrial	processing	of	asbestos	is	illustrative	of	the	
potential	for	significant	harms	to	be	generated	from	the	point	of	primary	extraction	to	final	use,	
including	the	historical	widespread	incorporation	in	buildings.	Processing	is	potentially	lethal	to	
workers	and	damaging	to	entire	local	communities	when	dust	is	distributed	beyond	production	
plants	 and	 into	 the	 surrounding	 environment,	 with	 fibres	 not	 only	 being	 inhaled	 but	 also	
settling	on	 land	and	water.	The	properties	 and	versatility	of	 asbestos	undoubtedly	explain	 its	
long	use	and	the	denial	of	problems	associated	with	both	its	production	and	its	instability	and	
deterioration	 in	 situ.	 But	 this	 denial	 has	 continued	 for	 over	 a	 hundred	 years,	 leaving	 a	 tragic	
history	 of	 chronically	 painful	 deaths	 and	 disease	 behind.	 The	 dangerousness	 of	 asbestos	was	
observed	 in	 Britain	 by	 Factory	 and	 Workshop	 Inspectorate	 officers	 as	 long	 ago	 as	 1898	
(Tweedale	2000)	and,	in	the	early	decades	of	the	twentieth	century,	its	lethal	effect	was	related	
to	the	death	of	textile	workers	in	France.	Soon,	the	deaths	attributed	to	the	substance	numbered	
in	the	thousands	and,	in	the	1960s,	it	emerged	that	relatives	of	workers	breathing	asbestos	were	
also	at	risk,	along	with	residents	in	areas	with	a	high	presence	of	the	substance.	Around	the	end	
of	the	1990s,	a	study	by	the	European	Environmental	Agency	(EEA)	estimated	that,	by	2035,	the	
number	of	people	developing	 lung	cancer	 could	 reach	300,000‐400,000.	 In	 total,	 the	estimate	
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indicates	 that,	 throughout	 the	 last	 century,	 around	 four	 million	 people	 died	 in	 Europe	 from	
asbestos‐related	illnesses.	The	use	of	asbestos	was	banned	by	the	European	Union	in	1999,	101	
years	after	the	discovery	of	its	danger.	One	of	the	reasons	it	took	so	long	to	ban	the	substance	
was	because	asbestos	‘kills	slowly’	and,	in	many	cases	that	were	ever	actually	brought	to	court,	
lawyers	 as	 well	 as	 pathologists	 could	 easily	 dismiss	 the	 association	 of	 asbestos	 with	 lethal	
respiratory	conditions.	
	
One	case	has	particular	relevance	because	of	 its	 international	 implications	and	because	 it	also	
marked	 the	 closing	 chapter	 of	 a	 100‐year	 history	 of	 industrial	 catastrophe.	 In	 June	 2013,	 the	
Appeal	Court	of	Turin	in	Italy	sentenced	Swiss	billionaire	Stephan	Schidheiny,	former	manager	
of	 the	Eternit	company,	to	18	years	 imprisonment	 for	environmental	disaster	and	violation	of	
health	and	safety	regulations.	According	to	the	European	Industrial	Relations	Observatory:		
	
Eternit	opened	its	first	asbestos	production	plant	in	Italy,	the	biggest	in	Europe,	
in	 1907	 at	 Casale	 Monferrato	 in	 Piemonte.	 Later,	 complexes	 were	 opened	 at	
Cavagnolo	in	Piemonte,	Rubiera	in	Emilia	Romagna,	and	Bagnoli	in	the	province	
of	 Naples.	 Although	 it	 has	 been	 known	 since	 1962	 that	 asbestos	 dust	 causes	
asbestosis	and	malignant	mesothelioma,	Eternit	only	closed	its	 last	 Italian	plant	
in	1986.	Throughout	the	plants’	production	life,	an	enormous	quantity	of	asbestos	
dust	 was	 dispersed	 into	 the	 atmosphere	 through	 factory	 chimneys	 that	 had	 no	
protective	 filter.	 The	 countryside,	 communities	 and	 water	 supplies	 around	 the	
plants	were	contaminated.	Within	the	plants,	workers	were	given	no	protection	and	
were	never	informed	of	the	health	risks	[emphasis	added].	(Rinolfi	2012:	3)	
	
According	 to	 the	 judges,	 evidence	 that	 owners	 and	managers	were	well	 aware	 of	 the	 lethally	
hazardous	work	conditions	in	the	plant	was	provided	by	their	willingness	to	pay	‘risk	bonuses’	
to	those	who	accepted	to	work	in	certain	specific	productive	operations	(Altopiedi	2013).		
	
Popular	mobilisation	and	citizen	action	played	a	major	role	in	bringing	this	history	of	harm	into	
the	arena	of	media	news	and	the	courts.	A	long‐running	and	contentious	affair	was	eventually	
transformed	by	popular	political	protest	from	a	matter	officially	deemed	an	‘accident’	into	a	trial	
concerning	 calamitous	 negligence	 and	 effectively	 a	 case	 of	 corporate	 mass	 killing.	 With	 an	
estimated	number	of	victims	of	2,857	(1,800	of	whom	were	deceased	at	the	time	of	the	verdict)	
the	trial	attracted	enormous	attention,	hearing	more	than	9,800	witnesses	and	with	hundreds	of	
people	attending	the	last	day	of	the	trial	when	the	sentence	was	announced.	Delegations	from	
Belgium,	the	Netherlands,	France,	Switzerland,	Brazil	and	the	US	were	also	in	court	on	that	day,	
taking	inspiration	for	similar	actions	to	be	initiated	in	other	national	contexts.		
	
The	 seriousness	 of	 the	 sentence	 was	 without	 precedent	 and	 can	 be	 seen	 to	 constitute	 the	
epilogue	 to	 a	 story	 spanning	 150	 years.	 However,	 the	 sentence	 also	 transcends	 the	 specific	
crime	 committed	 by	 Eternit,	 for	 it	 reinforces	 a	 principle	 of	 ‘precaution’.	 When	 faced	 with	
productive	 processes	 where	 the	 outcomes	 and	 consequence	 are	 likely	 to	 be	 severe,	 urgent	
measures	need	to	be	taken	even	when	available	evidence	is	not	overwhelming	and	even	if	this	
includes	 the	 total	 suspension	 of	 production.	 In	 this	 particular	 case,	 the	 application	 of	 such	 a	
principle	might	have	saved	thousands	of	lives	(Gallino	2013).	
	
Responses,	mitigation,	prevention	
White	(2013:	255)	points	out	that	‘not	everything	that	TNCs	[transnational	corporations]	do	is	
bad	or	wrong,	and	not	every	TNC	necessarily	engages	 in	things	 that	harm	the	environment	…	
This	 complicates	 analysis	 of	 perpetrators.’	 As	 noted	 above,	 ordinary	 consumers	 are	 polluters	
and	 the	 drivers	 of	 demand	 for	 the	 ‘goods’	 that	 bring	 with	 them	 environmental	 ‘bads’.	 But	
different	 consumers	 and	 different	 producers	 behave	 in	 different	 ways.	 There	 is	 diversity	 in	
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market	behaviours	and	inhuman	behaviours	and	there	are	points	of	action,	change	and	leverage	
to	be	noted	and	used.		
	
Dybing	(2012:	289),	drawing	on	research	and	experience	in	Norway,	suggests	that	control	and	
regulatory	agencies	alone	may	not	be	sufficient	to	prompt	a	company	to	take	responsibility	for	
behaviours	 and	 that	 impacts	 and	 other	 responses	 such	 as	 public	 ‘class	 actions’	 designed	 to	
provide	a	collective	means	to	obtain	remedy	from	the	company	can	be	powerful	alternatives.	Of	
course,	 as	 noted	 above	 in	 relation	 to	 large	 chemical	 companies	 like	Dow,	 the	 legal	 resources	
available	 to	 these	 businesses	 to	 counter	 and	 contest	 claims	 can	 be	 formidable.	 In	 the	 case	 of	
Norway,	Dybing	(2012)	suggests	that	close	monitoring	and	collaboration	with	companies	can	go	
hand‐in‐hand	and	be	effective.	
	
The	environmental	movement	in	Norway	has	for	the	last	two	decades	fought	to	
get	 publicity	 about	 the	 way	 in	 which	 modern	 business	 culture	 affects	 the	
environment,	 both	 in	 terms	 of	 its	 legal	 and	 illegal	 operations.	 Part	 of	 the	
movement	functions	in	close	connection	with	the	companies	to	ensure	that	it	can	
have	 some	 influence	 on	 the	 companies’	 decisions.	 NGOs	 can	 inform	 companies	
about	 the	 norms	 and	 the	 responsibilities	 involved	 in	 environmental	 protection	
systems,	 and	 even	 about	ways	 to	 become	more	 environmentally	 sustainable	 in	
the	 future.	 It	 is	 crucial	 that	 the	 government	assists	 such	 groups.	 (Dybing	2012:	
289)	
	
According	to	some	campaigners,	 ‘Only	citizen	action	can	help	change’	the	kind	of	practices	we	
have	been	describing	‘and	promote	a	healthier	world’	(McCormack	Benson	Health	&	Safety	nd).	
However,	 where	 such	 campaigning	 and	 informal	 and	 non‐statutory	 routes	 to	 mitigation	 and	
change	 fail,	 then	 there	 is	 a	 need	 for	 an	 effective	 legal	 platform.	 Relevant	 here	 would	 be	
proposals	 for	 the	extension	of	environmental	courts	currently	operating	 in	some	 jurisdictions	
and	the	establishment	of	an	International	Environmental	Court.	The	value	of	such	courts	lies	in	
the	focus	and	expertise	that	can	be	brought	to	bear	on	complex	and	technical	matters	that	are	
often	 unfamiliar	when	 introduced	 and	 processed	 through	 the	 traditional	 courts	 (Walters	 and	
Westerhuis	2013;	White	2013c).	Both	locally	and	internationally,	such	courts	could	draw	upon	
laws	 derived	 from	 international	 recognition	 of	 a	 crime	 of	 Ecocide	 (Higgins,	 Short	 and	 South	
2013).	 Such	 a	 law	 would	 be	 a	 powerful	 preventative	 force	 supporting	 the	 principle	 of	
precaution	noted	above.	By	 this	means,	 those	 in	 superior	or	 senior	positions	of	 responsibility	
would	 be	 at	 risk	 of	 prosecution	 if	 responsible	 for	 taking	 decisions	 that	 lead	 to,	 support	 or	
finance	 mass	 damage	 and	 destruction.	 Instead	 of	 ‘the	 polluter	 pays’	 (if	 caught),	 the	 new	
governing	principle	becomes	‘the	polluter	does	not	pollute’	and	the	protection	of	interests	shifts	
from	those	few	who	have	ownership	to	the	many	who	are	at	risk	of	suffering.		
	
Analysis	
In	 his	 2012	 book,	 The	 Price	 of	 Inequality,	 Nobel	 Prize	 economist	 Joseph	 Stiglitz	 argues	 that	
because	of:	
	
…	 the	 oil	 and	 coal	 companies	 that	 use	 their	money	 to	 influence	 environmental	
regulation,	 we	 live	 in	 a	 world	 with	 more	 air	 and	 water	 pollution,	 in	 an	
environment	that	is	less	attractive	and	less	healthy	than	would	otherwise	be	the	
case.	(Stiglitz	2012:	99)		
	
The	principal	focus	of	Stiglitz’	analysis	is	the	US	but,	as	Edsel	(2012)	notes	of	a	wave	of	recent	
counterarguments	against	both	Democratic	neo‐liberalism	and	Republican	laissez‐faire	theories,	
the	collective	critique:	
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…	is	not	only	that	inequality	violates	moral	values,	but	that	it	also	interacts	with	a	
money‐driven	political	system	to	grant	excessive	power	 to	 the	most	affluent.	 In	
short,	those	with	power	use	it	to	insulate	themselves	from	competitive	forces	by	
winning	 favorable	 tax	 treatment,	 government‐protected	 market	 share.	 (Edsel	
2012:	BR23)	
	
He	 argues	 there	 are	 other	 morally	 and	 economically	 un‐justifiable	 benefits	 that	 protect	 the	
powerful.	 Furthermore,	 the	 irresponsible	 and	 despoiling	 actions	 of	 the	 major	 corporations	
pursuing	 natural	 resource	 exploitation	 contribute	 to	 structural	 inequalities	 on	 the	 one	 hand	
and,	on	the	other,	to	the	distorting	dominance	of	the	GDP	model	of	‘growth	is	good	at	any	costs’.		
	
Gross	 Domestic	 Product	 is	 used	 in	 the	 forums	 of	 global	 economic	 power	 as	 the	 system	 of	
measurement	 of	 success	 but	 this	 is,	 as	many	 have	 pointed	 out,	 a	 rather	 flawed	measure.	 For	
example,	 critics	 of	 the	 permanent	 growth	 aspiration	 note	 that	 its	measurement	 tells	 us	 little	
about	negative	effects	such	as	distributional	and	social	justice.	Thus	countries	with	exceptional	
growth	 rates	may	 display	 exceptional	 levels	 of	 inequality	 and	 an	 average	 poor	 quality	 of	 life.	
GDP	 reflects	 the	 sum	of	 all	 the	 goods	 and	 services	produced	 inside	 a	 country,	 divided	by	 the	
number	of	people	 inhabiting	 it	 (Fioramonti	2013)	but	distorts	 the	actual	 success	of	 countries	
and	their	economic	systems,	not	only	because	it	fails	to	consider	variable	social	equality	but	also	
because	 it	 includes	 some	 service	 sectors	 which	 signal	 bad,	 rather	 than	 good,	 performance.	
Staggeringly	 obvious	 examples	 of	 these	 bad	 performers	 would	 be	 oil,	 chemical	 and	 mining	
companies	that	need	large	public	subsidies	to	produce	their	profits	and	that	leave	a	trail	of	eco‐
wreckage	 that	harms	public	health	and	eco‐system	vitality	 and	will	 require	yet	 further	public	
funding	 to	 mitigate,	 remedy	 and	 clean	 up.	 In	 this	 wider	 sense	 growth,	 GDP	 and	 resource	
exploitation	are	not	simply	about	economics	but	about	deep	social	disruption	(Carrington	et	al.	
2011).		
	
‘GDP’	 has	 been	 internationally	 adopted	 as	 a	way	 to	 conceptualise	 and	measure	 the	monetary	
value	of	goods	and	services	produced	and	sold	to	consumers	and	was	originally	formulated	by	
Simon	Kuznets	who,	in	1932,	started	to	generate	a	series	of	aggregate	indicators	incorporating	
the	total	productive	output	of	individuals,	private	firms	and	public	agencies.	Kuznets	himself	is	
said	to	have	reacted	to	the	uses	to	which	his	‘invention’	was	subsequently	put	as	he	would	have	
to	 the	 unintended	 creation	 of	 an	 economic	 Frankenstein.	 By	 the	 early	 1950s,	 GDP	 (earlier	
termed	 GNP)	 was	 accepted	 as	 the	 magic	 figure	 describing	 performance	 across	 the	 Western	
world	and	in	1953	‘the	UN	inaugurated	its	international	standards	for	national	accounts,	which	
were	 largely	 influenced	by	 the	methodology	developed	by	Kuznets	and	 the	US	Department	of	
Commerce’	 (Fioramonti	 2013:	 32).	 Imposed	 on	 developing	 countries,	 this	 measurement	 has	
implied	 that	 the	 road	 to	 a	 buoyant	 economy	 is	 built	 by	 selling	 resources	 in	 international	
markets	 and	 reducing	 domestic	 social	 expenditure.	 GDP	 does	 not	 take	 into	 account	 how	
developing	countries	are	largely	dependent	on	activity	in	the	informal	economy	sector.	Growth	
in	GDP	may	simply	reflect	deepening	social	inequality	as	the	affluent	increase	their	expenditure,	
the	 luxury	 goods	market	 thrives,	 and	 national	 resources	 that	 should	 be	 held	 in	 common	 are	
privatised	 or	 destroyed	 in	 the	 process	 of	 development	 while	 the	 poor	 see	 their	 purchasing	
power	decline.	
	
Crucially	for	present	purposes,	GDP	does	not	adequately	capture	costs	to	the	environment;	nor	
does	it	assess	the	sustainability	of	the	growth	that	is	occurring.	In	fact,	GDP	counts	costs	to	the	
environment	as	if	these	were	a	positive	factor	because,	in	official	measures,	such	costs	are	seen	
as	reflections	of	enterprise,	productivity	and	wealth‐creation.	The	counter‐view	would	see	such	
costs	as	an	index	of	despoilation,	meaning	that	the	depletion	of	resources	should	actually	equate	
to	diminishing	wealth	and	a	declining	GDP.	However,	the	counter‐view	is	just	that,	counter	to	the	
dominant	and	prevailing	analysis	which	will	reflect	 the	 fact	 that,	as	Stiglitz	 (2012:	99)	puts	 it,	
‘industries	like	coal	and	oil	…	don’t	want	the	scarcity	of	natural	resources	or	the	damage	to	our	
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environment	 to	 be	 priced,	 and	 they	 don’t	 want	 our	 GDP	 metrics	 to	 be	 adjusted	 to	 reflect	
sustainability’.		
	
Including	 costs	 to	 the	 environment	 as	 a	 negative	 item	 within	 the	 GDP	 would	 imply	 that	
industries	should	be	charged	for	the	damage	caused.	As	they	are	not	charged,	they	are	indirectly	
receiving	hidden	subsidies	which	add	to	other	gifts	such	as	favourable	tax	treatment	and	access	
to	 resources	 at	 below	 fair	 market	 prices.	 Oil	 companies	 intending	 to	 intensify	 or	 multiply	
offshore	drilling	are	aware	that,	simultaneously,	they	have	to	ensure	that	laws	are	implemented	
which	make	them	unaccountable	for	the	possible	damage	produced:	
	
Because	 of	 the	 oil	 and	 coal	 companies	 that	 use	 their	 money	 to	 influence	
environmental	regulation,	we	live	in	a	world	with	more	air	and	water	pollution,	
in	an	environment	 that	 is	 less	attractive	and	 less	healthy	than	would	otherwise	
be	the	case.	(Stiglitz	2012:	99)		
	
Environmental	 regulations	are	not	 the	only	 target	of	polluting	 industrial	parties,	 as	 funds	are	
also	 generously	 distributed	 among	 groups	 that	 ‘scientifically’	 cast	 doubt	 on	 climate	 change	
(Goldenberg	2013).		
	
Neo‐liberal	 antagonism	 toward	 economic	 regulations	 argues	 these	 are	 costly	 and	will	 reduce	
growth.	 In	 this	 view,	 ‘regulation’	 is	 what	 Taylor	 (1997)	 called	 a	 ‘condensed	 metaphor’	
representing	 a	 broader	 (and	 unwelcome)	 critique.	 And	 indeed,	 an	 alternative	 critical	 view	
argues	 that	 economic	 development	 that	 causes	 environmental	 degradation	makes	 a	 negative	
contribution	 to	 the	 creation	 of	 wealth	 and	 reducing	 growth	 in	 a	 managed	 way	 is	 desirable	
(Ruggiero	and	South	2013)	–	and	could	help	shape	a	‘green	economy’.	A	green	economy	may	be	
where	we	ideally	need	to	get	to.	At	the	moment,	the	economy	is	resolutely	resource	hungry	and	
growth	orientated.	
	
Conclusion	
As	Harvey	(2011)	writes	of	the	lessons	of	neo‐liberalism:	
	
The	drive	towards	market	 freedoms	and	the	commodification	of	everything	can	
all	too	easily	run	amok	and	produce	social	incoherence.	The	destruction	of	forms	
of	 social	 solidarity	 leaves	 a	 gaping	 hole	 in	 the	 social	 order.	 It	 then	 becomes	
peculiarly	 difficult	 to	 combat	 anomie	 and	 control	 the	 resultant	 anti‐social	
behaviours	such	as	criminality.	(Harvey	2011:	80)	
	
In	 turn	 this	 social	 incoherence	 extends	 to	 a	 loss	 of	 proper	 social	 thinking	 about	 anti‐
environmental	 behaviours	 (Beck	 1992:	 25),	 forms	 of	 despoilation	 and	 acts	 that,	 as	 Walters	
(2010:	181)	puts	it,	‘create	devastating	conditions	for	the	lives	of	local	people’.	Yet,	at	the	same	
time	as	such	condoning,	denial	and	‘business	as	usual’	continue,	it	is	also	true	that	‘green	issues’	
are	highly	topical.	In	a	globalised,	information‐rich	world	there	is	no	shortage	of	awareness	that	
resource	depletion	and	climate	change	represent	matters	of	urgency	and	challenge.	The	great	
global	 conundrum	 for	 the	 future	 is	 how	 to	 address	 energy	 deficits	 and	 balance	 this	 with	
addressing	 the	 problem	 of	 sustainability.	 A	 related	 problem	 faces	 us	 as	 we	 become	 a	 ‘waste	
society’:	how	to	cope	with	the	unwanted	discards	of	consumer	society	and	mounting	waste	as	
the	west	continues	to	consume	at	a	ferocious	rate	and	developing	nations	are	rapidly	generating	
their	 own	 markets	 and	 demand?	 In	 the	 midst	 of	 a	 global	 economic	 downturn,	 remedies	 for	
prevailing	economic	insecurity	and	depression	are	viewed	almost	entirely	in	terms	of	pushing	
the	 production	 lines	 back	 to	 full	 power	 and	 increasing	 the	 rate	 of	 consumption	 by	 applying	
‘human	genius’	to	enterprise	and	exploitation.	There	is	an	interesting	criminological	crossroads	
here	where	public	policy	 solutions	 to	environmental	 and	economic	problems	can	prove	 to	be	
criminogenic	and	lead	to	the	convergence	of	corrupt	parties	in	local	government,	business	and	
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organised	crime	(Caneppele	et	al.	2013;	Ruggiero	and	South	2010).	Examples	in	this	essay	have	
included	oil,	 chemical	 and	processing	 industries	but	others	might	 include	 the	development	of	
carbon	 trading	 markets	 and	 their	 misuse	 and,	 as	 one	 prime	 current	 example,	 widespread	
related	fraud	(Walters	and	Martin	2012).	Perhaps	what	is	needed	for	the	future	is	less	of	a	rapid	
return	 to	 ‘business	 as	 usual’	 and	 a	 new	 turn	 toward	 ethical	 practice,	 green	 economics	 and	
modes	of	production	and	consumption	based	on	principles	of	environmental	sustainability.	
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